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Abstract
While the system stabilizing function of reciprocity is widely acknowledged, much less atten-
tion has been paid to the argument that reciprocity might initiate social cooperation in the first
place. This paper tests Gouldner’s early assumption that reciprocity may act as a ‘starting
mechanism’ of social cooperation in consolidating societies. The empirical test scenario builds
on unequal civic engagement between immigrants and nationals, as this engagement gap can be
read as a lack of social cooperation in consolidating immigration societies. Empirical analyses
using survey data on reciprocal norms and based on Bayesian hierarchical modelling lend
support for Gouldner’s thesis, underlining thereby the relevance of reciprocity in today’s
increasingly diverse societies: individual norms of altruistic reciprocity elevate immigrants’
propensity to volunteer, reducing thereby the engagement gap between immigrants and natives
in the area of informal volunteering. In other words, compliance with altruistic reciprocity may
trigger cooperation in social strata, where it is less likely to occur. The positive moderation of
the informal engagement gap through altruistic reciprocity turns out to be most pronounced
for immigrants who are least likely to engage in informal volunteering, meaning low, but also
highly educated immigrants.
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Introduction
Reciprocity is first of all known for its system stabilizing function, which explains how social cooper-
ation can be maintained in established societies (Axelrod, 1984). According to a hitherto largely
neglected argument, reciprocity is not only functional in established societies, but it might even initiate
social cooperation in early phases of group consolidation, where ‘people are brought together in new
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which should be used for any reference to this work
juxtapositions and combinations, and where impending exchange is typically viewed as dangerous and 
the other is viewed with suspicion’ (Gouldner, 1960: 177). More than 50 years after Gouldner’s (1960) 
seminal work, experimental as well as empirical research still neglects this line of reasoning. Yet, every 
social system has had its beginnings, and every new constellation of people brings with it the possibility 
of new social systems (Gouldner, 1960: 177). Most contemporary immigration societies exhibit at times 
traits of these ‘early phases of group consolidation’ described by Gouldner, and offer therefore a realistic 
empirical scenario to test whether reciprocity may act as a starting mechanism of social cooperation.
A look at informal voluntary engagement rates in Switzerland, Europe’s country with the second larg-
est immigrant share after Luxembourg (Eurostat, 2014),1 reveals for instance a significant engagement 
gap between immigrants and natives, corroborating the impression of a lack of social cooperation in 
immigration societies. As data of the Swiss volunteering survey 2009 reveal, 31% of Swiss citizens 
engage in informal volunteering, whereas only 23% of non-nationals report informal voluntary activi-
ties. Informal volunteering, which comprises voluntary engagement outside organizational structures 
such as helping in the neighbourhood (Wilson and Musick, 1997), represents a particularly suitable indi-
cator to capture the emergence of social cooperation, as it constitutes a non-institutionalized but spon-
taneous and original form of civic engagement (Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010: 72f). Using Gouldner’s 
(1960) starting mechanism argument, I expect that compliance with altruistic reciprocity (Berger, 2013; 
Diekmann, 2004), which expresses a prosocial orientation and captures the moral obligation to return a 
good or service received in the past, should enhance immigrants’ propensity to engage in informal volun-
teering, narrowing thus the engagement gap between immigrants and nationals.
The paper’s contribution to existing research is threefold: first and foremost, I examine a classical yet so 
far neglected thesis by testing the argument that altruistic reciprocity may act as a starting mechanism of 
social cooperation (Gouldner, 1960) based on the real setting of a contemporary immigration society. Sec-
ond, the study complements existing research on reciprocity, which is dominated by experimental data (cf. 
Axelrod, 1984; Diekmann, 2004; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) as it 
uses survey data from the Swiss volunteering survey 2009 (Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010). Third, experi-
mental models are restricted to the analysis of reciprocal behaviour and, therefore, any inference made 
about underlying norms is based on the consistency of behavioural data with theoretical propositions 
(Diekmann et al., 2014). Although there is reason to believe that reciprocal behaviour is related to recipro-
cal norms (Maximiano, 2012), there are more direct ways to capture these norms, such as through individ-
ual compliance with reciprocal norms, which is the approach chosen in this paper.
Switzerland offers a suitable setting for a first empirical test of Gouldner’s starting mechanism 
hypothesis based on survey data. To start with, the Swiss federation ranks among the most important 
destinations of immigration of the post-World War II era (Koopmans, 2010: 3). While Switzerland’s 
large non-national share is not least a product of a restrictive jus sanguinis citizenship regime, the coun-
try also scores highest when it comes to absolute levels of immigrant influx per 1000 inhabitants in Eur-
ope (Meuleman et al., 2009: 362). Overall, Switzerland’s restrictive and assimilationist understanding of 
citizenship (e.g. Koopmans, 2010) offers a particularly interesting context to test the evolution of social 
cooperation in a contemporary immigration society which sets the hurdles to ‘become Swiss’ very high 
for non-nationals. Another argument in favour of the Swiss setting relates to the subnational comparative 
research design of this study. The 26 Swiss cantons are powerful political entities in an unusually decen-
tralized federation, which lead prominent comparatists to recommend analysing this microcosm of Eur-
ope (Lijphart, 1999; Rokkan, 1974). The Swiss context allows me thus to test individual associations in a 
comparative perspective with subnational units approximating a most similar systems design, where the 
factors of central interest, first of all informal volunteering, vary considerably between cantons.
Reciprocity as a ‘starting mechanism’ of social cooperation
Throughout the history of mankind, the norm of reciprocity facilitated social interaction between human 
beings (cf. Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). While existing research distinguishes manifold forms of the
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concept (cf. Berger, 2011; Diekmann, 2004; Perugini et al., 2003), in the end all varieties of reciprocity 
can be traced back to the general idea that giving and receiving are mutually contingent (Gouldner, 
1960). Apart from reciprocal behaviour, reciprocal norms, on which this paper focuses, reveal distinct 
motivations underlying reciprocity. While strategic reciprocity is guided by the expectation of future 
rewards, a ‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod, 1984), the internalized norm of altruistic reciprocity is not 
bound to future expectations, but arises out of a moral obligation or ‘shadow of indebtedness’ (Gouldner, 
1960) to return a good or service received in the past (cf. Berger, 2011, 2013; Diekmann, 2004). While 
Gouldner himself did not use the term altruistic reciprocity, his moral norm of reciprocity reflects the 
very same idea, as it ‘defines certain actions and obligations as repayments for benefits received’ 
(Gouldner, 1960: 170). Unlike Gouldner, whose norm of reciprocity comprises actions and attitudes, the 
paper focuses on reciprocal attitudes only, as the very association between reciprocal attitudes and social 
cooperation, i.e. informal volunteering as a form of prosocial behaviour, is under scrutiny here.
Strategic reciprocity is first of all known for its system stabilizing function (Axelrod, 1984; Diek-
mann, 2004; Gouldner, 1960). As game theoretical models were able to demonstrate (cf. Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), rational actors often choose cooperative strategies 
in social exchange situations although they lack certainty that their cooperative behaviour will be 
returned (social dilemmata). In these contexts, cooperation occurs because people developed realistic 
expectations – for instance based on previous social interactions or established social norms – that their 
cooperative behaviour will be rewarded (Axelrod, 1984). Combined with mutual trust, this strategic reci-
procal behaviour facilitates the maintenance of social cooperation in established societies.
By contrast, the argument that reciprocity may act as a starting mechanism of social cooperation 
(Gouldner, 1960) received far less attention in the literature so far. As a starting mechanism, recipro-
city can be functional in early phases of certain groups, where people are brought together in new 
combinations, before they have developed a differentiated and customary set of status duties (Gould-
ner, 1960: 176). Referring to Hobbes’s (2010 [1651]) archaic state of nature, Gouldner (1960: 177) 
describes such a situation as one  in  which each is likely to regard impending exchange  as  dangerous  
and view the other with suspicion. From a utilitarian perspective, the main challenge in this early 
stage of societal consolidation relates to the fact that people have apparently no incentive to coop-
erate: they not only lack certainty regarding others’ intentions, but in the absence of established cus-
toms  and norms, they also lack specific expectations concerning the behaviour of others. Thus, if 
people would only act out of prospective (meaning strategic reciprocal) considerations, the evolution 
of cooperation would appear very unlikely, unless enforced by a superior authority (cf. Hobbes, 2010 
[1651]). Following a less utilitarian line of reasoning, social cooperation could, however, also be 
jump started through more selfless and unconditional motives. Such motives are inherent in altruistic 
reciprocity, which stands for the willingness to reciprocate a given favour even when there is no 
‘shadow of the future’ in which reciprocation can be rewarded, or non-reciprocation punished. This 
is where Gouldner’s (1960) argument of reciprocity as a starting mechanism of social cooperation 
sets in: if internalized, the norm of reciprocity not only represents the obligation to repay a received 
benefit at some time due to feelings of indebtedness; individuals adhering to this reciprocal norm will 
probably also expect the same reciprocal attitude from others (Gouldner, 1960: 177). Consequently, 
there may be less hesitancy in being the first cooperator and a greater facility with which the 
exchange and the social relation can get underway (Gouldner, 1960: 177). Adapted to the present 
research context, this would mean that altruistic reciprocals should not only be more likely to reci-
procate, but also to initiate social cooperation.
An empirical test of Gouldner’s (1960) starting mechanism hypothesis does not require going back to 
a Hobbesian state of nature. As Gouldner (1960: 177) correctly observes, people are continually brought 
together in new juxtapositions and combinations, which bring with them the possibilities of new social 
systems, but also bear the risk of intergroup conflict (Allport, 1954). This is particularly true for contem-
porary immigration societies, which naturally imply that people are repeatedly brought together in new 
juxtapositions and combinations. As a consequence, immigration societies exhibit at times traits of early
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stages of societal development, where impending exchange might be ‘viewed as dangerous and the other 
viewed with suspicion’ (Gouldner, 1960: 177).
Test scenario: social cooperation in immigration societies
Luckily, modern immigration societies are far away from a brute Hobbesian state of nature. A look at the 
existing literature nevertheless seems to suggest that social cooperation is, at least at times, hampered in 
contemporary immigration societies. According to a prominent line of reasoning, increasing diversity 
induced by global migration affects mutual trust (Putnam, 2007). While this point of view has been con-
tested and qualified by several follow up studies (cf. Hooghe et al., 2009; Portes and Vickstrom, 2011), 
other researchers again point to the segregationist potential of immigration societies in western Europe 
(Koopmans, 2010). What is more, several studies attest immigration societies’ weak primary networks at 
the communal level in terms of lower organizational involvement or volunteering of immigrants com-
pared to native citizens (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Wilson, 2012). As these examples show, immigra-
tion societies represent a special, since asymmetric, form of early societal consolidation. New members, 
i.e. non-nationals who were fully or partly socialized in another societal context, enter an established 
society, where social cooperation is more or less consolidated among members of the host society.
Following the line of reasoning outlined in the preceding section, it seems unlikely that under such 
circumstances social cooperation of the new social group (i.e. non-nationals) evolves out of mere stra-
tegic reciprocity, as the payoff of a cooperative action appears too uncertain. Instead, compliance with 
the internalized norm of altruistic reciprocity (Berger, 2011; Diekmann, 2004) might play a crucial role 
in getting cooperation started in immigration societies. On the one hand, and following Gouldner’s 
assumption, altruistic reciprocals should appear trustworthy and might thereby even motivate strategic 
individuals to cooperate, as they have some realistic expectation that they will be repaid. On the other 
hand, individuals endorsing high levels of altruistic reciprocity might indeed have a preference to coop-
erate unconditionally, which could jump start cooperation as they exhibit traits of a prosocial personality 
such as strong moral concerns (McClintock and Allison, 1989; Van Lange, 1999).
One way to account for the lack of social cooperation in immigration societies in behavioural terms is 
to look at unequal civic engagement between immigrants and natives such as, for instance, volunteering. 
My focus will be on informal volunteering, which captures any voluntary activity that takes place out-
side formalized structures such as organizations, but also outside one’s own household. Informal volun-
teering typically refers to activities such as helping and supporting friends, neighbours, acquaintances, 
and relatives, such as mowing the neighbours’ lawns or watching their children (Stadelmann-Steffen 
et al., 2010; Wilson and Musick, 1997). I consider informal volunteering a basic form of social cooper-
ation mainly for two reasons: to start with, the social exchange occurring during informal volunteering is 
less institutionalized than formal volunteering for organizations or associations. As a consequence, 
informal volunteering represents a spontaneous and original form of social interaction with low entry 
thresholds for everyone (Huijts and Kraaykamp, 2012; Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010: 72f). Therefore, 
informal volunteering is a particularly suitable indicator to account for the very emergence of social 
cooperation. Secondly, informal volunteering embodies ideas of solidarity and unconditional help which 
facilitate social cooperation (Clary et al., 1996; Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010: 88).
One might object that informal volunteering for members of the same immigrant group (ethnically 
homogeneous bonding social capital), which might bear a risk of segregation, should be distinguished 
from informal volunteering for others (ethnically heterogeneous bridging social capital). However, this 
classification has been questioned in recent research, where the two forms of social capital are presented 
as complementary rather than competitive (cf. Nannestad et al., 2008; Sinha et al., 2011). This is not to 
say that bonding immigrant social capital has only and always desirable societal consequences, just as it 
would be misguided to assume that access to bridging majority social networks is generally beneficial 
(Cederberg, 2012). Yet, considering the importance of bonding social capital as a source of social sup-
port and wellbeing of immigrants in societies in which they frequently experience discrimination, I adopt
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a comprehensive perspective of informal volunteering including immigrants’ bonding and bridging
activities.
Altruistic reciprocity and informal volunteering, in turn, share important motivational precondi-
tions. The concept of informal volunteering itself is not restricted to acts of mutual commitments.
At the same time, existing research suggests that obligations, which are inherent to altruistic recipro-
city, are a powerful predictor of, for instance, informal helping activities (Wilson and Musick, 1997:
700). As already mentioned above, informal volunteering is furthermore predominantly driven by
altruistic motivations (e.g. ‘helping others’) which correspond to the helping character of altruistic
reciprocity (Clary et al., 1996; Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010: 88; Wilson and Musick, 1997:
695). In line with Putnam’s (2000: 118) observation that ‘altruistic behaviours tend to go together’,
it can thus be assumed that the norm of altruistic reciprocity is positively related to immigrants’ infor-
mal volunteering (cf. Manatschal and Freitag, 2014). Yet, the parameter of interest is not immigrants’
informal volunteering per se, but the lack of social cooperation, which can be captured by the engage-
ment gap between immigrants and natives, meaning immigrants’ lower propensity to engage in infor-
mal volunteering compared to natives. Figure 1 shows how altruistic reciprocity can act as a jump start
of social cooperation by enhancing immigrants’ propensity to volunteer, narrowing thereby the
engagement gap between immigrants and natives. Hypothesis 1 summarizes this assumption.
H1: Altruistic reciprocity moderates the engagement gap between immigrants and natives to the
extent that immigrants indicating high levels of altruistic reciprocity volunteer not significantly
less than natives.
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Figure 1. Moderating effect of altruistic reciprocity.
N: natives; I: immigrants; IL: lowly educated immigrants; IM: medium educated immigrants; IH: highly
educated immigrants; R: altruistic reciprocity. Dotted line: threshold below which informal volunteering
is significantly lower compared to native citizens.
Hypothesis 1 starts from the simplistic assumption that immigrants constitute a homogenous group. 
Yet, existing research shows that the propensity to volunteer varies for instance between different ethnic 
and racial groups (Sundeen et al., 2009). So far, studies on immigrant civic engagement pay only little 
attention to more dynamic aspects of immigrant heterogeneity such as social status differences. Consid-
ering education represents one of the most powerful and consistent predictors of virtually all forms of 
volunteering, this neglect is surprising (Kaasa and Parts, 2008; Putnam, 2000: 118; Wilson, 2012). 
According to Wilson (2012: 182), education boosts volunteering because more highly educated people 
have broader horizons, as measured by attention to current affairs. Based on these considerations, I 
account for immigrants’ heterogeneity regarding their social status by distinguishing three educational 
groups: lowly, medium and highly educated immigrants.
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Lowly educated immigrants
Low-skilled immigrants are commonly perceived of as an especially disadvantaged social group. As a
look at the data confirms, immigrants belonging to this group are most vulnerable to unemployment or
likely to be reliant on a low salary full-time job – both factors are not necessarily conducive to voluntary
engagement (Sundeen et al., 2009; Wilson, 2012). Considering that low human capital in terms of edu-
cation is an obstacle to civic engagement, I expect lowly educated immigrants to engage significantly
less in informal volunteering compared to natives, and that this engagement gap should be moderated
by altruistic reciprocity.
Medium educated immigrants
Immigrants exhibiting a medium level of education presumably comprise former working migrants from
southern Europe who have already lived in Switzerland for several years and should therefore be most
familiar with, and incorporated into, Swiss society. To put it in Gouldner’s (1960) terms, middle edu-
cated immigrants constitute the most consolidated immigrant group within Swiss society. As a conse-
quence, I expect that medium educated immigrants do not engage significantly less in informal
volunteering than natives, which renders the moderating effect of reciprocity for this group obsolete.
Highly educated immigrants
In line with research findings on volunteering, one could expect highly educated immigrants to exhibit
the highest levels of informal voluntary engagement among all immigrant groups, since they should be
most sensitive and responsive to societal challenges. At the same time, and as a closer data inspection
confirms, highly educated immigrants have a higher probability of working full-time for career rea-
sons, meaning that they have only scarce capacities for low prestige activities such as informal volun-
teering. What is more, the group of high skilled immigrants also comprises a highly mobile global
elite, whose self-understanding is rather cosmopolitan than local. Therefore, high skilled immigrants
are likely to constitute the group with the lowest level of informal local volunteering, with reciprocity
exerting a potentially strong moderating effect on the engagement gap between highly educated immi-
grants and Swiss citizens. Based on this discussion, Hypothesis 2 refines the general assumption made
in Hypothesis 1 (cf. Figure 1).
H2: The moderating effect of altruistic reciprocity on engagement gaps in informal volunteering is
particularly pronounced for lowly and highly educated immigrants, whereas it is irrelevant for
medium educated immigrants.
Data and research design
To test the hypotheses outlined above, I base my analysis on the Swiss volunteering survey 2009 
(Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010). Depending on the model estimated, the final sample from the Swiss 
volunteering survey comprises between 5993 and 6213 Swiss and non-national respondents in the 26 
Swiss cantons. The individuals in the cantons were randomly chosen and questioned by means of com-
puter assisted telephone interviews (CATI). In order to obtain a sufficiently high number of respondents 
for each subnational unit (N  100), the random sample was stratified disproportionally among cantons. 
My dependent variable is whether or not an individual engages in informal volunteering. The mea-
surement refers to the reported informal voluntary engagement as indicated by the Swiss volunteering 
survey 2009: ‘Did you perform any type of unpaid work beyond volunteering in associations or other 
organizations, such as babysitting (children other than your own), neighbourly-aid, participating in any 
kind of projects, organizing festivities in your neighbourhood, etc. in the last four weeks? (The work has
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to be for the benefit of people outside one’s own household)’. Respondents indicating informal voluntary 
engagement were allocated the value of 1, while all others were assigned the value 0.
The parameter of interest is, however, not the dependent variable, but the engagement gap in informal 
volunteering, that is, the relationship between non-national background and informal volunteering. This 
gap evolves already from a mere descriptive inspection of the data, where immigrants report signifi-
cantly lower levels of informal volunteering (23.7%) compared to nationals (31.6%; t ¼ 4.47; p ¼ 
0.00). The central independent variables at the individual level are thus non-national background and 
altruistic reciprocity, which is expected to moderate the relationship between non-national status and 
informal volunteering.
As for altruistic reciprocity, respondents were asked to indicate their agreement on a scale ranging 
from 0 (no agreement) to 10 (total agreement) to the following item of the Swiss volunteering survey 
2009: ‘I take particular effort to help someone who has helped me in the past’. This statement implies 
compensation for past goodwill, expressing thereby a moral obligation or a ‘shadow of indebtedness’ to 
reciprocate (Gouldner, 1960: 174), which corresponds to the general idea of altruistic reciprocity. While 
this item covers only one aspect of altruistic reciprocity (cf. Berger, 2013: 34), it comes closest to Gould-
ner’s specific understanding of the norm of reciprocity in his starting mechanism argument, which is 
under scrutiny here.2 A descriptive inspection of the data reveals that on average, non-nationals and 
Swiss citizens do not differ in their commitment to altruistic reciprocity (cf. Table A1 in the appendix). 
Whether brought along from the country of origin or adopted in the host society, non-nationals do also 
accede to altruistic reciprocity. In line with Gouldner (1960), I expect that this compliance with altruistic 
reciprocity might make a difference when it comes to non-nationals’ informal voluntary behaviour.
In order to explain informal volunteering, I control for education (Hypothesis 1), and I also use this 
variable to create specific immigrant educational groups (categorical variable for lowly, medium and 
highly educated immigrants, with Swiss citizens as reference category) for testing Hypothesis 2. I further 
build on former research on the individual determinants of volunteering (cf. Salamon and Sokolowski, 
2003: 77; Wilson, 2012; Wilson and Musick, 1997), and integrate gender and age as socio-demographic 
individual characteristics into the analysis. I furthermore account for employment status as well as reli-
gious affiliation (cf. Putnam, 2000; Ruiter and De Graaf, 2006; Wilson, 2012). Additionally, I add resi-
dential stability, i.e. how long the respondent has lived at his or her current residence, since rootedness 
might be related to informal volunteering (Voicu and Serban, 2012).
At the contextual level, a canton’s degree of urbanization as well as the language region is integrated 
into the models, as these contextual factors have proven to be important in explaining volunteering in 
Switzerland (Kriesi and Baglioni, 2003; Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010). I use the values of the contex-
tual factors measured prior to 2009 to assure that the potential predictor precedes the outcome. More 
detailed information on all variables (operationalization and sources) as well as descriptive statistics can 
be found in Table A1 in the appendix.3
Methodologically, I apply random intercept models, implying that individual behaviour can vary 
between cantons (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). I prefer multilevel analysis over fixed-effects models, 
as this allows me to explain cantonal variation in informal volunteering by including macro-level char-
acteristics (in the present case, of the contextual control variables at the cantonal level), instead of just 
controlling for this variation. As the dependent variable is dichotomous, individual volunteering of 
immigrants is transformed into a logit structure. A Bayesian estimation approach is used, which has been 
shown to perform better than maximum likelihood, particularly when employing multilevel models 
faced with a small number of level 2 units (Stegmu¨ller, 2013). For an easy interpretation of the Bayesian 
estimation results, the mean and the 95% credible interval of the posterior distribution are provided, 
which can be interpreted as in a standard regression situation. The mean is the average effect of an inde-
pendent variable on the outcome variable, and the credible interval, the Bayesian analogue to confidence 
intervals in a standard regression context, gives a sense of the statistical reliability of this estimate. If the 
credibility interval does not include zero, I speak of relevant coefficients, which corresponds to signif-
icant coefficients in frequentist terms.4
7
Table 1. Moderating effect of altruistic reciprocity on non-nationals’ engagement gap in informal volunteering.
Model 1 Model 2
Fixed effects
Constant –0.89 [–1.33:–0.45] –0.89 [–1.32:–0.49]
Individual level
Gender (ref.cat.: male) 0.41 [0.30:0.52] 0.37 [0.26:0.47]
Age –0.01 [–0.01:–0.00] –0.01 [–0.01:–0.00]
Education (ref.cat.: medium education)
Low education –0.54 [–0.70:–0.39] –
High education 0.05 [–0.08:0.17] –
Employment (ref. cat.: part-time)
Full-time employment –0.40 [–0.54:–0.26] –0.43 [–0.56:–0.29]
Not employed –0.03 [–0.16:0.10] –0.13 [–0.25:0.01]
Residential stability 0.04 [–0.03:0.10] 0.03 [–0.03:0.09]
Religious affiliation (ref. cat.: Protestant)
Catholic –0.05 [–0.16:0.06] –0.07 [–0.17:0.04]
Other –0.07 [–0.32:0.18] –0.04 [–0.28:0.21]
None –0.07 [–0.23:0.08] –0.04 [–0.19:0.11]
Non-national –1.04 [–1.85:–0.26] –
Non-national educational groups (ref. cat.: Swiss citizens)
Lowly educated immigrant – –2.82 [–5.17:–0.77]
Medium educated immigrant – –0.23 [–1.16:0.67]
Highly educated immigrant – –2.55 [–5.65:–0.67]
Altruistic reciprocity 0.04 [0.01:0.06] 0.03 [0.01:0.06]
Immigrant * altruistic reciprocity 0.08 [0.00:0.17] –
Lowly educated immigrant * altruistic recip. – 0.24 [0.01:0.49]
Med. educated immigrant * altruistic recip. – 0.00 [–0.10:0.10]
Highly educated immigrant * altruistic recip. – 0.24 [0.03:0.47]
Contextual level
Urbanization –0.11 [–0.21:–0.00] –0.10 [–0.20:0.01]
Regional provenance 0.01 [0.00:0.001] 0.01 [0.00:0.01]
Random effects
Contextual level variance 0.01 [0.00:0.02] 0.01 [0.00:0.02]
N 5993 (26) 6213(26)
DIC 7268.35 7567.95
Note: Mean posterior distributions of logistic Bayesian multilevel regression coefficients (log-odds), and 90% credible interval
(squared brackets); relevant coefficients are printed in bold; all models were calculated in MLwiN using Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) estimation (100,000 iterations, burn-in 1000, diffuse [gamma] priors); no signs of non-convergence; DIC: Deviance 
Information Criterion.
Empirical results
In the following, I present a two-stage analytical procedure to examine whether altruistic reciprocity 
equalizes immigrant engagement gaps in informal volunteering.
In a first step, I set out a basic model which includes individual and contextual variables as well as the 
same level interaction terms testing a moderating effect of altruistic reciprocity on the relationship between 
immigrant background and informal volunteering (see Table 1). Model 1 in Table 1 contains the basic 
interaction based on immigrant background and altruistic reciprocity, whereas Model 2 tests the more 
subtle interaction between lowly, middle and highly educated immigrants and altruistic reciprocity.
To start with, the constitutive terms of the interaction effects in Models 1 and 2 corroborate the 
assumption of an immigrant engagement gap: as expected, immigrants in general (Model 1), as well
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Figure 2. Marginal effect of non-national background on informal volunteering for different values of 
altruistic reciprocity.
Note: Marginal posterior distributions (last 1000 iterations) including histogram with frequency distri-
bution of observations in sample for altruistic reciprocity (grey bars); black line: mean, grey lines: 95%
credible interval (2.5% and 97.5% percentiles) based on Model 1 in Table 1. N ¼ 5993 respondents, of 
whom 769 respondents have a non-national background. ‘Probability that ME differs’ indicates the share 
of iterations for which the marginal effect of low education is smaller if the values of altruistic reciprocity 
vary from one standard deviation below the mean (6.4) to the maximum (10).
ME: marginal effect.
as lowly and highly educated immigrants in particular (Model 2), are less likely to engage in informal 
voluntary activities compared to Swiss citizens, if the moderating variable altruistic reciprocity takes the 
value 0. Furthermore, both models largely confirm earlier studies, according to which the likelihood for 
informal volunteering is higher for women, whereas this probability is lower for full-time employed 
individuals (Wilson and Musick, 1997). Informal volunteering rates are higher in German-speaking can-
tons, which is commonly explained by cultural differences and political factors. The more family-
oriented social culture in Latin cantons is expected to hamper civic engagement. By contrast, the vivid 
use of direct democracy in German-speaking cantons is assumed to yield a participation enhancing effect 
on civic engagement (Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2010: 117f). Interestingly, local residence period does 
not affect the likelihood of informal volunteering, which could reflect the spontaneous and unconditional 
nature of informal as opposed to formal volunteering.5
In a second step, I tested whether high levels of altruistic reciprocity may reduce the engagement gaps 
identified in Table 1. To this end, I estimate and illustrate the marginal effects of non-national back-
ground (Figure 2) and the three educational immigrant groups respectively (Figure 3) on informal volun-
teering for different levels of altruistic reciprocity, based on Models 1 and 2 in Table 1. In line with 
Hypothesis 1, the marginal effects presented in Figure 2 draw an increasing line, indicating that immi-
grants reporting higher values of altruistic reciprocity are more likely to engage in informal volunteering 
compared to immigrants reporting low values of altruistic reciprocity. What is more, the 95% credibility 
interval touches the zero line when altruistic reciprocity amounts to 10 (maximal value), suggesting that 
the engagement gap caused by non-national background becomes irrelevant when individuals attest 
themselves a very high level of altruistic reciprocity.
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Figure 3. Marginal effect of three immigrant educational groups on informal volunteering for different 
values of altruistic reciprocity.
Note: Marginal posterior distributions (last 1000 iterations) for low (left graph), medium (middle graph) 
and high education (right graph); black line: mean; grey lines: 95% credible interval (2.5% and 97.5%
percentiles) based on Model 2 in Table 1. N ¼ 6213 respondents, of whom 156 were non-national 
respondents with low, 395 non-national respondents with middle, and 165 non-national respondents 
with high education. ‘Probability that ME differs’ indicates the share of iterations for which the marginal 
effect of low education is smaller if the values of altruistic reciprocity vary from one standard deviation 
below the mean (6.4) to the maximum (10).
ME: marginal effect.
In order to check for which values of altruistic reciprocity this effect is substantial (Berry et al., 
2012), Figure 2 also contains the frequency distribution of observations in the sample. As could be 
expected due to social desirability, the frequency distribution is negatively skewed with the vast 
majority of observations attesting themselves high values of altruistic reciprocity. This affects the 
precision of the estimation for lower levels of altruistic reciprocity. To restrict the interpretation 
of marginal effects to meaningful quantities, I calculated the probability of a positive moderation for 
the 86% of all respondents included in the analysis (i.e. 86% of the nationals and 87% of the non-
nationals) who indicated high values on the reciprocity scale, covering the range from 6.4 (mean 
minus one standard deviation) to the maximum of 10. This probability amounts to 92% (standard 
deviation ¼ 0.28), indicating that the moderating effect of altruistic reciprocity on the nationality-
gap is relevant and substantial at the 10% level.
Analogous to Figure 2, Figure 3 comprises the marginal effects for lowly, middle and highly edu-
cated immigrants on informal volunteering for different values of altruistic reciprocity. The three plots 
confirm the differentiated theoretical expectations formulated in Hypothesis 2, according to which 
especially lowly and highly educated immigrants are responsible for the overall engagement gap 
between immigrants and natives: the engagement level of middle educated immigrants (middle plot 
in Figure 3) does not substantially differ from the one of Swiss citizens, which renders a moderating 
effect of reciprocity obsolete. By contrast, there are pronounced engagement gaps for low and even 
more for highly educated immigrants (left and right plots in Figure 3), which are both positively mod-
erated by altruistic reciprocity.
Similar to the marginal effects reported in Figure 2, the marginal effects in Figure 3 are not only 
relevant, but also substantial: the probability of a substantive positive moderation of altruistic reci-
procity amounts to 92% in the left graph, and even 98% in the right graph of Figure 3. To sum it
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up, the engagement gap in informal volunteering loses its relevance (lowly educated immigrants) or 
disappears entirely (highly educated immigrants) for individuals attesting themselves high levels of 
altruistic reciprocity.
In the remainder of this section, I discuss the robustness of these findings. Due to the small num-
ber of observations for single nationalities, it is unfortunately not possible to control for this factor in 
the analysis. A look at the composition of the three educational groups by nationality, however, 
shows that there is no disproportionate pattern which would allow tracing back the observed differ-
ences to specific nationalities. As separate analyses not reported here for west-European non-
nationals only revealed, the negative engagement gap remains significant and is positively moderated 
by altruistic reciprocity even for this immigrant group which shares a similar cultural background 
with Swiss citizens. Finally, additional models not reported here reveal that the moderating effects 
described above could not be replicated if strategic reciprocity, which stands for the idea that to help 
someone is the best way to receive help in the future (cf. Diekmann, 2004), instead of altruistic reci-
procity, was used.
Discussion and conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to examine Gouldner’s (1960) neglected argument that reciprocity has not 
only a system stabilizing function in established societies, but might already act as a starting mechanism 
of social cooperation in early phases of societal consolidation. Using unequal engagement between 
immigrants and nationals in the area of informal volunteering as an indicator for a lack of social coop-
eration in immigration societies, I tested whether individual compliance with the norm of altruistic reci-
procity has the potential to narrow this engagement gap, and thus initiate social cooperation, as 
postulated by Gouldner (1960).
The Bayesian multilevel analyses based on survey data of the Swiss volunteering survey 2009 sug-
gest that immigrants endorsing altruistic reciprocity as a trait of a prosocial personality may indeed 
play a crucial role in jump starting social cooperation in contemporary immigration societies. To start 
with, immigrants engage significantly less in informal volunteering than nationals, which I identified 
as a lack of social cooperation within Switzerland’s immigration society. This engagement gap turns 
out to be most pronounced for immigrants exhibiting low levels of altruistic reciprocity, and it 
diminishes with increasing compliance with this altruistic norm. Finally, immigrants indicating the 
highest levels of altruistic reciprocity no longer differ substantially in their propensity for informal 
volunteering compared to Swiss citizens. More differentiated analyses furthermore revealed that this 
moderating effect of altruistic reciprocity on immigrants’ informal voluntary engagement is mainly 
attributed to those groups who are least likely to engage in informal volunteering, meaning lowly and 
highly educated immigrants.
The findings of this paper bear important implications for the research on reciprocity, on the one 
hand, as well as on social cooperation in immigration societies, on the other hand. Most importantly, 
the results seem to confirm Gouldner’s (1960: 176) classical but so far neglected thesis that recipro-
city is functional in early phases of certain groups, where people are brought together in new juxta-
positions and combinations and where impending exchange is typically viewed as dangerous and the 
other is viewed with suspicion.
From the perspective of the empirical test scenario, the findings presented here furthermore contrib-
ute to the research on social cohesion in societies of immigration. While existing research repeatedly 
observes a lack of social trust, social cohesion and civic engagement in contemporary immigration soci-
eties (Laurence, 2011; Putnam, 2007; Wilson, 2012), the study at hand offers a more optimistic perspec-
tive. It seems like reciprocity is not only functional in early phases of societal consolidation, but it might 
even act as a trigger of social cooperation in societies of immigration. Overall, the results of this study 
seem thus to support the argument that reciprocity represents a more relevant, since less demanding, 
basis for social cohesion in immigration societies than trust (Hooghe, 2007).
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The study at hand is a first step in testing the cooperation initiating potential of reciprocal norms
based on survey data. Future research shall subject the suggestive and explorative findings presented
here to critical scrutiny. Research based on larger immigrant samples could provide more nuanced
evidence on whether the moderating effect of altruistic reciprocity varies, for instance between
non-national and naturalized individuals. Longitudinal data on this topic would be particularly useful
to disentangle potential causal pathways between reciprocal norms and social cooperation, which
would be an important added value to the merely cross-sectional nature of the associations reported
in this paper. So far, such an endeavour is complicated by data limitations, especially the scarcity of
survey data on reciprocity, and existing international studies use rather indirect measures to capture
reciprocal norms, be it through trusting attitudes (Leo´n, 2012: 203) or mere perceptions of reciprocal
behaviour (Laurence, 2011: 75). At the same time, European social survey data from 2006 reveal an
engagement gap between immigrants and nationals when comparing individual informal helping
across west-European countries. The fact that we find such a negative engagement gap even for infor-
mal helping, which is narrower than informal volunteering, suggests that the issue under consider-
ation here clearly matters beyond Switzerland. To test Gouldner’s starting mechanism thesis more
systematically not only across and within other contemporary immigration societies, but also over
time, differentiated survey data on informal volunteering, which also cover different forms of altruis-
tic reciprocity (cf. Berger, 2013), are needed.
Engagement gaps in informal volunteering represent only one way to account for social cooper-
ation in real life exchange situations. However, the results presented here are in line with recent game
theoretical research proving the relevance of altruism and reciprocity in other emerging social
exchange contexts such as online markets (cf. Diekmann et al., 2014). While there is no doubt that
strategic reciprocity is fundamental for the maintenance of social cooperation in established commu-
nities, the societal function of reciprocity, as Gouldner (1960) suggested, does not stop here. The
starting mechanism function of reciprocity merits more attention, especially in today’s consolidating
immigration societies.
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Notes
1. In this article, immigrants are defined in a narrow sense, referring to non-nationals only, since
the data do not allow a further distinction of the migration background of an individual (e.g.
naturalized foreign or Swiss born). Yet, given Switzerland’s restrictive jus sanguinis citizenship
regime, non-nationals constitute a large share of the population with migration background in
Switzerland.
2. Besides this person-specific form of positive altruistic reciprocity which stands for the obligation
referred to by Gouldner (1960) to return a favour received to that same person, altruistic reciprocity
can for instance also take a negative form (i.e. to punish unfriendly behaviour) or be of a generalized
nature, where giver and receiver are no longer identical (cf. Berger, 2013).
3. A look at the descriptive statistics in Table A1 shows that women and older people are slightly over-
represented in the sample, which has to do with the increasing difficulty of the CATI survey method
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to reach certain segments of the population such as young people. Since the analyses control for age
and gender, this data limitation should, however, not affect the empirical evidence presented here.
4. The fundamental inference logical differences between Bayesian and frequentist estimation techniques
notwithstanding, there should be little practical differences in the results (Hadfield, 2014: 5). As fur-
ther analyses not reported here confirm, using a frequentist maximum likelihood estimation
approach did not alter the results.
5. While residence period might not matter so much for the overall population, it could make a differ-
ence for immigrants’ informal volunteering, given that immigrants’ propensity for formal volunteer-
ing increases with length of residence (cf. Voicu and Serban, 2012). Yet, as additional models based
on non-national respondents only reveal, neither local nor national residence period affect non-
nationals’ informal volunteering.
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Appendix
Table A1. Variables, operationalization, and data sources.
Variable Summary statistics Operationalization/sourcea
Dependent variable
Informal voluntary
engagement
Shares (whole sample):
Volunteer: 30.7%
Non-volunteer: 69.3%
Shares (Swiss):
Volunteer: 31.6%
Non-volunteer: 68.4%
Shares (non-nationals):
Volunteer: 23.7%
Non-volunteer: 76.3%
Dummy: 1 ¼ Individual performs informal unpaid
work; 0 ¼ individual does not perform informal
voluntary work outside associations or
organizations and outside their own household
(e.g. babysitting others’ children, helping out in the
neighbourhood, involvement in projects,
organizing (street) festivities, etc.).
Independent variables – individual level
Altruistic reciprocity Mean (whole sample): 8.4
SD: 1.9
Min.: 0
Max.: 10
Mean (Swiss): 8.3;
SD: 1.9
Mean (non-nationals): 8.5;
SD: 2.1
Agreement on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 ¼ no
agreement, 10 ¼ total agreement): ‘I put a
particular effort in helping someone who has
helped me in the past’.
(continued)
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Table A1. (continued)
Variable Summary statistics Operationalization/sourcea
Strategic reciprocity Mean: 6.5
SD: 2.8
Min.: 0
Max.: 10
Agreement on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 ¼ no
agreement, 10 ¼ total agreement): ‘helping
someone is the best method to be certain that one
will receive help in the future’.
Gender Shares:
Male: 39.2%
Female: 60.8%
Dummy: 0 ¼ men; 1 ¼ women.
Age Mean: 56.5
SD: 17.1
Min.: 17
Max.: 98
Age (in years) of the persons interviewed.
Nationality Shares:
Swiss: 88.1%
Non-national: 11.9%
Dummy: 0 ¼ Swiss; 1 ¼ non-national.
Educational level Shares:
Low education: 14.2%
Medium education: 66.9%
High education: 18.9%
Highest completed level of education, 3 categories:
(1) no education higher than obligatory school or
low educational achievements; (2) secondary
education; (3) tertiary education.
Employment Shares:
Full-time: 32%
Part-time: 21.5%
Not employed: 46.5%
3 categories: (1) full-time employed; (2) part-time
employed; (3) not employed.
Religious affiliation Shares:
Protestant: 35.7%
Catholic: 44.5%
Other: 5.3%
None: 14.5%
4 categories: (1) Protestant;
(2) Catholic; (3) other; (4) none.
Residential stability Mean: 3.7
SD: 0.8
Min.: 1
Max.: 5
Time spent living in same place, 5 categories: (1) less
than one year; (2) one to three years; (3) three to
10 years; (4) more than 10 years; (5) since birth.
Independent variables – contextual level
Urbanization Shares:
Urban / aggl.: 69.4%
Rural: 30.6%
Dummy: 0¼ rural, 1¼ urban/agglomeration; Source:
Federal Statistical Office: population census, 2000.
Regional provenance Mean: 78.2
SD: 33.9
Min.: 13
Max.: 99
Percentual share of German-speaking population
within a canton; Source: based on Federal
Statistical Office, population census 2000.
aAll individual variables are taken from the Swiss volunteering survey 2009.
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